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Recent Developments in the Law
Jamie S. Manuel
Mayhall & Blaize, LLC
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
I. Act 312
1. MJFarms, Ltd v. Exxon Mobile Corporation, 2008 WL 2811534,
2007-2371 (La. 7/1/08).
In 2005, MJ Farms, Ltd. ("MJ Farms") purchased approximately
42,000 acres located in Catahoula and Avoyelles parishes. MJ Farms'
purchase was made subject to various mineral reservations and pre-
existing oil and gas leases. On April 25, 2006, MJ Farms filed a suit
against numerous oil and gas company defendants, alleging that said de-
fendants caused environmental damages to the property when they con-
ducted oil and gas exploration and production activities. MJ Farms
sought damages for the cost of containment, clean up, remediation and
restoration of the surface to its original condition, exemplary damages
under La. C.C. art. 2315.3, as well as costs of the action and attorney
fees, and for the loss of civil fruits (such as loss of income due to crop
losses).
Plaintiff set forth numerous arguments as to why Act 312 should not
be applied to their action, all of which were not followed by the Supreme
Court. Initially, the plaintiff asserted two (2) non-constitutional argu-
ments in support of their claim that Act 312 should not be applied in this
case: 1) Because Act 312 only amended Title 30 to the revised statutes,
which deals with State agencies, plaintiff argued that the provisions of
Act 312 should be limited to those actions brought by public entities,
rather than actions brought by a private land owner, such as the instant
action; 2) That Act 312 cannot be applied retroactively because the legis-
lature did not include express language that Act 312 was to be applied
retroactively. The Court refuted the plaintiffs' first argument stating that,
"the fact that private parties have a cause of action for clean up of their
property under the mineral code does not remove the matter from DNR's
jurisdiction", and "Act 312 requires DNR compliance by private parties
involving clean up and remediation activities subject to DNR's jurisdic-
tion." The Court also refuted the second argument, holding that although
Act 312's applicability clause was phrased in the negative, said clause
clearly stated that Act 312 applies to any case other than those in which a
court has not issued or signed an Order setting a case for trial as of
March 27, 2006.
MJ Farms asserted three (3) different constitutional arguments: 1)
That the application of Act 312 to this case would unconstitutionally di-
vest the plaintiff of vested rights because the plaintiffs petition herein
1-
1
Manuel: Recent Developments in the Law
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2009
was filed prior to the effective date of Act 312; 2) That Act 312 is uncon-
stitutional because it deprived plaintiffs of access to the Courts; and 3)
That Act 312 is unconstitutional because it deprives the district court of
its original jurisdiction. The Court refuted the plaintiffs first argument
finding that Act 312 did not alter the substantive rights of the plaintiff,
finding that, "Act 312 attaches a procedure for judicial resolution of
claims for environmental damage" and thus could be applied retroac-
tively to the plaintiff's case. The Court found that the restrictions placed
on plaintiffs private rights were "reasonable statutory restrictions and
reasonable exercise of the police power". Finally, the Court refuted
plaintiffs arguments with respect to Act 312 denying it access to the dis-
trict court, stating that "although Act 312 changes the remedy available
to MJ Farms in its effort to obtain surface restoration of its immoveable
property, we do not find this denies it access to the Courts. To the con-
trary, under the provisions of Act 312, the district court remains an active
participant in the entire restoration process." The Court refused to follow
plaintiffs' argument with respect to the divestiture of the district court's
original jurisdiction, stating that, "Not only is the claim for environ-
mental damages filed in the district court, the claim is not deferred to
DNR until the district court determines environmental damage exists and
further determines the legally responsible party."
Accordingly, for these reasons, the Supreme Court found that Act
312's application to the instant action was constitutional.
2. Tensas Poppadoc, Inc. v. Chevron, 984 So.2d 223, 2007-927 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 5/21/08).
Plaintiff is the owner of certain immoveable property located in the
Lake St. John Oil Field in Concordia Parish, Louisiana. Plaintiff alleged
that various oil and gas exploration defendants contaminated or other-
wise damaged its property, and sought compensatory damages to cover
the costs of remediation and restoration, loss of use, diminution of value
and mental anguish.
The issue before the Third Circuit was the proper procedure for im-
plementing the provisions and requirements of Act 312. The defendants
argued that Act 312 allows for the Judge or jury to determine whether or
not environmental contamination exists, and also what parties are liable
for that contamination. After this, the defendants argue that the matter is
to be deferred to Louisiana Department of Natural Resources in order for
that agency to develop a proper remediation plan to remedy the environ-
mental damage. Upon DNR doing so, the defendants argued that the
Judge would then determine which plan is the most feasible plan from
among various plans submitted by the LDNR, the plaintiffs or the defen-
dants. The defendants argue that the only function that a jury may have
once the matter is referred to the LDNR, is to determine the amount of
damages recoverable for private claims. The defendants proposed a case
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management plan which requires referral of the case to LDNR to allow it
to make decisions regarding clean up and remediation, subject to court
approval, before a jury trial is scheduled for plaintiffs' private claims.
In following its prior decisions in Germany, et al v. Conoco Philips
Company, et al, 07-1145 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/5/08), 980 So.2d 101 and
Bernard v. BP America Production Co., 07-1249 (La. App. 3 Cir.
4/2/08), 981 So.2d 73, the Court found that for judicial efficiency and the
avoidance of piecemeal litigation, that, "One trial of all issues is the most
plausible interpretation of..." Act 312. Accordingly, the Court held that
there would be a trial on all issues, including all issues of liability and
damages, prior to the case being referred to LDNR.
II. State/Federal Lands
3. Chevron USA, Inc. v. State of Louisiana, et al, 993 So.2d 187,
2007-2469 (La. 9/8/08).
The State created the Buras Levee District ("BLD") by Louisiana
Act No. 18 of 1894. The State transferred certain immoveable property
defined within the geographic limits to the BLD based on Act No. 18 of
1894. By Act No. 324 of 1938, Louisiana legislature redefined the geo-
graphic limits of the BLD. On June 11, 1938, the Board of Commission-
ers of the BLD granted a mineral lease to Delta Development Company
covering multiple tracts of land, including Tract No. 87 and Tract No. 1
(the "1938 Lease"). Chevron was a sublessee of Delta Development
Company. Chevron and/or its predecessor maintained oil and gas produc-
tion at all times since February 11, 1939, except for a temporary cessa-
tion in 2005 caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The BLD was
merged into the Plaquemines Parish Government ("PPG") on April 15,
1975.
The State of Louisiana later raised a question as to whether the
lands conveyed to the BLD were properly conveyed, thus raising a title
issue as to whether the State or BLD/PPG held title to Tract 87. Because
of the existence of this title dispute between the State and PPG, Chevron
filed a concursus proceeding seeking to determine whether PPG or the
State of Louisiana, which had granted a competing lease, owned the
mineral rights to Tract 87. Plaquemines Parish Government v. The State
of Louisiana, 01-1027, 01-1028 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/10/02), 826 So.2d 14,
writ denied, 02-1304 (La. 9/13/02), 824 So.2d 1170 (hereinafter some-
times referred to as the "Tract 87 litigation"). The Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court Judgment in favor of PPG, and recognized the
continuing validity of Chevron's 1938 Lease from BLD.
Following the Tract 87 litigation, the State refused to confirm, when
requested by Chevron, that the State would not contest PPG's right to
receive royalties derived from Unit Tract 1, based on the holding of the
Court in the Tract 87 litigation that Chevron's 1938 Lease was valid. Be-
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cause of this refusal, Chevron filed this concursus proceeding seeking to
determine whether PPG or the State is entitled to receive the royalties
from production derived from Unit Tract 1. Chevron and PPG filed Mo-
tions for Summary Judgment arguing that the State's claim to royalties
derived from Unit Tract 1 was barred by res judicata because of the Final
Judgment issued in the Tract 87 litigation. Chevron asserted that because
the immoveable at issue in the Tract 87 litigation, i.e., the 1938 Chevron
Lease, was recognized as valid and in effect, that that ruling should have
res judicata effect as to this case due to the fact that it involves the same
immoveable, i.e., the 1938 Chevron Lease.
The Supreme Court refused to apply the doctrine of res judicata and
reversed the Court of Appeals decisions finding the case was barred by
res judicata. The Court of Appeals had held that the cause of action as-
serted in the Tract 87 litigation and the Tract 1 litigation arose out of the
same transaction or occurrence, i.e., the 1938 Chevron Lease, rather than
any single tract of land contained therein. The Supreme Court stated that
while "the Court of Appeals did implicitly recognize the validity of the
BLD Lease in the Tract 87 litigation... that simple fact does not neces-
sarily mean that the Tract 87 litigation is res judicata to this case." The
Supreme Court more narrowly defined the transaction or occurrence in
this case stating that, "The transaction or occurrence giving rise to the
dispute [in this case] was Chevron's uncertainty concerning the proper
party entitled to receive royalties derived from Chevron's mineral lease
on Unit Tract 1. The State is not, as Chevron and PPG seem to argue,
seeking to invalidate Chevron's Lease from the BLD of the property
conveyed by the State to BLD." The Court found that the immoveable
serving as the transaction or occurrence in this case was Unit Tract 1, as
opposed to the 1938 Chevron Lease. Additionally, the Court found that
since there was an issue as to whether and how much Unit Tract I was
inundated with water at the time that Chevron's 1938 Lease was granted,
in addition to many other issues that differed from the Tract 87 litigation,
that PPG and Chevron failed to demonstrate that there were no genuine
issues of material fact left to be resolved. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court reversed and remanded to the trial court.
4. Price v. Tenneco Oil Corporation, 996 So.2d 1260, 2008-441 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 11/5/08).
On the night of July 21, 2001, an allision occurred between the M/V
Papillon, a wooden-hulled trawler, and an unlighted, unmarked well
structure in White Lake in Vermillion Parish. The individuals on the ves-
sel suffered damages and filed suit to recover. The waterbottom on which
the well structure is situated is owned by the State of Louisiana. The well
and its adjacent structure was constructed by Tenneco Oil Company in
1985 within State Lease 11713, pursuant to a permit granted by the State
on January 25, 1985. State Lease 11713 terminated in 1994 due to lack
-4-
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of production. The well, which had been plugged and abandoned in
1992, was deemed "orphaned" by Louisiana Office of Conservation on
August 17, 1995.
The Court herein referred to the Supreme Court decision of Giorgio
v. Alliance Operating Corporation, 05-02 (La. 1/19/06), 921 So.2d 58, in
which the State was found not to be the owner or custodian of an un-
lighted well structure in a factually similar case. Based on this holding,
the State filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was granted by
the trial court. The Cowl herein referred to the Giorgio decision in which
the Court found that the State did not have the obligation to install or
maintain lights on the well structure as is mandated by federal law, but
rather the owner of said well structure had that duty. The Court also re-
ferred to Giorgio's holding that the State's act of declaring the well or-
phaned was a regulatory act which did not result in the State becoming
owner of the site or becoming responsible for lighting the structure sur-
rounding the well.
Plaintiffs also argued that the State, while possibly not the owner,
was liable for the unlighted structure because the State had custody or
guard thereof, and obtained a benefit from same. The Court herein held
that the plaintiffs failed to establish that they would be able to prove at
trial that the State had guard or custody of the well, i.e., that the State
was in control of and benefited from the well, as contemplated by the
Supreme Court's decision in Giorgio. Accordingly, the Court herein af-
firmed the trial court's granting of the Summary Judgment in the defen-
dant's favor.
5. CMS Trunkline Gas Co., LLC v. State ex rel. Dept of Transp. and
Development, 980 So.2d 849, 2007-1390 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/2/08).
CMS Trunkline Gas Company, LLC, et al (collectively referred to
as "Trunkline") filed this action to recoup the costs of relocating three (3)
of its pipelines that cross Highway 28 in Rapides Parish. The relocation
of the three (3) pipelines beneath Highway 28 was necessitated by a
DOTD highway widening project. Trunkline acknowledged that to the
extent its pipelines were within the DOTD right-of-way, it must bear the
expenses incurred in relocating the three (3) pipelines to locations within
the said right-of-way. However, as to the portions of the three (3) pipe-
lines that were located outside of DOTD's right-of-way that must be re-
located due to Trunkline burying the pipelines deeper as per the DOTD
request, Trunkline contends that it is entitled to recoup all relevant ex-
penses incurred as a result thereof. DOTD contended that it did not have
any financial responsibility for these costs for relocation per the language
contained in the permit granted to Trunkline's predecessor.
The Court cited language in the permit that allowed DOTD to re-
quire the relocation of pipelines "as may at any time be considered nec-
essary to permit the relocation, reconstruction or widening of a highway,
5
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and that the cost of making such changes, additions, repairs or reloca-
tions are to be born by the pipeline company." The Court found that the
permit language was clear and that Trunkline was obligated to pay for
the cost of relocation regardless of where the pipelines were situated with
respect to the DOTD's right-of-way.
IHl. Contract Issues
6. Coastal Drilling Co, LLC v. Shinn Enterprises, Inc., 2008 WL
907520 (E.D.La).
On September 10, 2004, Watson Energy ("Watson") and Shinn En-
terprises ("Shinn") contracted with the plaintiff, Coastal Drilling Com-
pany ("Coastal"), to drill a well on a lease owned by Watson and Shinn.
Coastal performed services and incurred expenses under the contract to
prepare for the spudding of the well, however, Coastal was never paid for
those services rendered. Coastal filed suit against Shinn for damages as a
result of the breach of the drilling contract. Shinn filed an Answer along
with a Third Party Complaint against Jack Capella, an officer of Shinn,
who executed the drilling contract allegedly without the authority and/or
capacity to bind Shinn. Because Capella lacked authority and/or capac-
ity, Shinn argued that the drilling contract is unenforceable against it.
Coastal argued that because Capella was an officer of Shinn at the
time the drilling contract was executed, Capella possessed both actual
and apparent authority to bind Shinn to the drilling contract under Lou-
isiana mandatary law, specifically La. C.C. art. 3021, which states: "One
who causes a third person to believe that another person is his mandatary
is bound to the third person who in good faith contracts with the putative
mandatary." Before the Court herein was a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment filed by Coastal in which Coastal sought a declaration that
Shinn is bound to the drilling contract, that there are no genuine issues of
material fact and that Coastal is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
with respect to Capella's status as an agent/mandatary of Shinn.
The District Court denied Coastal's Motion for Summary Judgment
finding that although Shinn might not have done anything to dispel the
image that Capella was the agent for Shinn, such inaction did not equate
to a manifestation of Capella's authority by Shinn so as to amount to the
existence of apparent authority. With respect to actual authority, Shinn's
testimony that it did not authorize Capella to sign the drilling contract
stands in contrast to Capell's testimony that he did possess Shinn's au-
thority, thus creating a genuine issue as to material fact.
7. Coastal Drilling Co, LLC v. Shinn Enterprises, Inc., 2008 WL
2178070 (E.D. La.).
The Court herein denied Coastal's Motion for Reconsideration of
the preceding decision. Additionally, the Court considered a Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Shinn wherein Shinn argued that it was re-
-6-
6
Annual Institute on Mineral Law, Vol. 56 [2009], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol56/iss1/5
lieved of liability under the drilling contract pursuant to an Assignment
to certain third party defendants that agreed to be bound by the drilling
contract. Citing a provision in the drilling contract wherein the parties
thereto agreed that, "In the event of an assignment, the assigning party
shall remain liable to the other party as the guarantor of the performance
by the assignee of the terms of this contract," the District Court denied
Shinn's Motion for Summary Judgment stating that even though Shinn
assigned its interest in the lease, it still remained liable pursuant to said
provision.
8. Fuller v. XTO Energy Co., Inc., 2008 WL 3400832, 43,454 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 8/13/08).
Plaintiffs, George Fuller and Charles Fuller, are the owners of land
and minerals located in Lincoln Parish, Louisiana (hereinafter referred to
as "the Fuller Tract"). The Fullers filed this action against XTO seeking
damages arising out of XTO's construction of a drilling site that strad-
dled the Fuller Tract and another tract of land owned by the Williams
Family (hereinafter referred to as "the Williams Tract"). In constructing
its drillsite, XTO removed dirt from the Fuller Tract and placed it on the
Williams Tract in order to level the drillsite out. Both the Fuller and Wil-
liams Tracts were subject to an Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease in favor of
XTO. Plaintiffs filed this action seeking damages for the removal of said
dirt, and XTO filed a reconventional demand for damages arising out of
the Fullers' interference with XTO's exercise and use of its leasehold
rights.
The trial court awarded Plaintiffs $68,870.04 for the value of the
dirt removed from their property and placed on the Williams Tract, and
$1,251.77 for the value of timber removed from Plaintiffs' property.
Based on testimony from expert witnesses stating that XTO's construc-
tion of its drillsite and the use of the dirt obtained from the Fuller Tract
was an appropriate construction technique, the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's decision granting the Fullers damages for the removal of
the dirt. In citing Prather v. Chevron USA, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 1366 (M.D.
La. 1983), the Court found that, "The right to remove dirt on the leased
premises includes the right to use the moved dirt to build the well site
without paying for the dirt."
The Court also cited to the fact that both tracts were contained in a
Commissioner of Conservation Unit, and thus, XTO did not require the
landowners' consent or pre-entry payment for use of said dirt even
though the majority of the drillsite was located on the Williams Tract
rather than the Fuller Tract. Citing Nunez v. Wainoco Oil and Gas Co.,
606 So.2d 320 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1992), writ denied, 608 So.2d 1010 (La.
1992). Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
XTO committed the tort of conversion by removing the dirt, because by
acquiring the lease from the plaintiffs, XTO also acquired use of the sur-
-7
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face of the Fuller Tract, and the evidence established that XTO's use the-
reof was reasonable.
9. Broussard v. Hilcorp Energy Company, 2008 WL 5158887 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 12/10/08).
Plaintiffs own immovable property located in Vermilion Parish,
Louisiana, which is subject to mineral, surface, and subsurface leases
granted by the plaintiffs to Hilcorp Energy Company, in addition to other
oil and gas companies and pipeline companies (collectively referred to
herein as "Hilcorp"). Plaintiffs alleged that the oil and gas companies
negligently conducted their oil and gas operations by attempting to con-
ceal contamination by burying contaminated soil.
In addition to other exceptions, plaintiffs asserted an exception of
prematurity arguing that the action for damages was premature because
the leases provided for cleanup only after termination of operations on
the property, and that the Mineral Code provides for a putting in default
prior to filing suit for certain breaches of mineral leases. The trial court
granted the defendants' exception of prematurity and dismissed their ac-
tion without prejudice. The Third Circuit herein reversed the trial court's
judgment granting the defendants' exception of prematurity, citing Dore
Energy Corporation v. Carter-Langham, Inc., 04-1202, 04-1233, 04-
1373, 05-0006 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/4/05), 901 So.2d 1238 in which the
Court therein stated the following: "This Court concluded that, while the
duty of the lessee to restore the land to its former state, reasonable wear
and tear excepted, was an obligation not due until completion of opera-
tions, the claims for negligence, breach of contract, exemplary damages,
damages for trespass, and maritime tort arising from the lessee's obliga-
tion to maintain the leased lands as a reasonable prudent operator as re-
quired under La.R.S. 31:122 did not have to wait until completion of op-
erations to be heard." The Court herein found that plaintiffs' cause of
action was not premature because petition made allegations that the de-
fendants have "exercised their rights under leases unreasonably or exces-
sively" and have failed to operate the leased properties as reasonable
prudent operators.
10. Dore Energy Corporation v. Carter-Langham, Inc., 2008 WL
4792509 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/5/08).
Dore Energy owns approximately 18,000 acres of land in Cameron
Parish, which it purchased in 1995. Dore's predecessor in title to said
immovable property, Cameron Meadows Land Company, granted a min-
eral lease to H.M. Henshaw (the "Henshaw Lease"). The interest in the
lease was assigned to various companies, one of which was ExxonMobil
Oil Corporation ("Exxon"), who operated on the lease for 21 years. Ex-
xon released much of the leased acreage and conveyed the other portions
prior to Dore's purchase of the property in 1995. Dore filed suit alleging
that the property was severely damaged by canals and oilfield wastes,
-8-
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and instituted this suit against 21 corporations and 1 individual who had
at various times conducted oil and gas exploration and production opera-
tions on the subject property. Dore sought general and punitive damages
as well as contract damages for the cost associated with cleaning up and
restoring the land. Prior to trial, Dore indicated that it had settled with all
of the defendants except Exxon. After trial on the matter the jury
awarded Dore $57,000,000.00 in damages. Exxon moved for a JNOV,
which the trial court granted and which is the subject to of this appeal.
Dore argued that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the jury
erred in awarding contract damages because of a lack of privity between
Dore and Exxon. The trial court concluded that a reasonable jury could
not have concluded that privity of contract existed between Dore and
Exxon because the original transfer of interest in the Henshaw Lease to
Vacuum Oil was a sublease rather than an assignment, and therefore
there existed no privity of contract between the lessor (Dore) and the
sublessee (Exxon). citing Smith v. Sun Oil Company, 165 La. 907, 116
So. 379 (1928).
The Third Circuit disagreed with the trial court's categorization of
the Henshaw to Vacuum agreement as a sublease, saying that Henshaw
only maintained an override, and retained no control or interest whatso-
ever in the lease assigned to Vacuum, thus concluding that said agree-
ment was an assignment rather than a sublease. The Court also points to
the fact that Vacuum's successors when amending the original mineral
lease did not include Henshaw as a party to these amendments thereby
treating the agreement between Henshaw and Vacuum as an assignment
in which Henshaw held no other interest other than an override. Also, the
Court found that even if the agreement between Henshaw and Vacuum
Oil can be considered a sublease, that Mineral Code Article 128 provides
specifically that an assignee or sublessee acquires the rights and powers
of the lessee and becomes responsible directly to the original lessor for
performance of the lessee's obligations. The court then held that Mineral
Code 128 could be retroactively applied to the Henshaw to Vacuum Oil
agreement due to the fact that a pre-code jurisprudence with respect to
assignments and subleases was not so clearly settled that it vested Exxon
with rights that prohibit retroactive application of the Mineral Code. Ac-
cordingly, Third Circuit found that the trial court erred in granting a
JNOV in favor of Exxon and entered a judgment in favor of Dore Energy
Corporation and against Exxon Mobil Oil Corporation in the amount of
$57,000,000.00, together with legal interest from the date of judicial de-
mand until paid.
11. Pearl River Navigation, Inc. v. Imperial Petroleum, Inc., 2008 WL
2743756 (E.D.La.).
Plaintiff is a Louisiana corporation who provides labor and equip-
ment to operators of oil and gas wells. Defendant, Imperial Petroleum,
-9-
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Inc. ("Imperial"), is a Nevada corporation, having an interest in certain
wells located in the Coquille Bay Field near Buras, Louisiana. Imperial
owed the plaintiff $552,700.00 for labor and equipment provided to the
defendant on open account. Plaintiff filed suit in an attempt to recover
said amount, and obtain a writ of sequestration directing the sheriff to
take possession of the hydrocarbon production from 11 oil wells in the
Coquille Bayou Field, and to seize all monies owed to defendant by pur-
chasers of hydrocarbon production from those wells. The state court
granted Plaintiff s writ of sequestration.
Imperial removed the action to federal court and filed a Motion to
Vacate and Dissolve the Writ of Sequestration granted by the State Court
judge. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3501, which sets forth
the procedure for obtaining a writ of sequestration, requires a plaintiff to
file either a verified petition or a sworn affidavit setting forth the allega-
tions in support of the desired writ. The federal District Court found that
plaintiff failed to comply with this requirement, and on this basis va-
cated, and dissolved the State Court writ.
12. Rathborne Land Co., LLC v. Ascent Energy, Inc., 2008 WL
5427751 (E.D.La.).
Rathbome Land Company, LLC ("Rathbome") sued its mineral lessees,
Ascent Energy, Inc. and Ascent Energy Louisiana, LLC (collectively
herein referred to as "Ascent"), for cancellation of its mineral lease.
Rathbome alleged that Ascent failed to produce a mineral lease in paying
quantities and that Ascent was a bad faith possessor of the leased acreage
based on La. C.C. art. 487 and 488.
Since the inception of the mineral lease in 1952, 3 wells were suc-
cessfully drilled and completed on the Rathborne acreage, with only 1
well still in service prior to the lawsuit, being the Rathbome No. 2 Well.
Between 1998 and 2001, the then lessee performed 6 workover opera-
tions on 2 of the Rathborne wells, but most of that work occurred in
1998. As of the year 2000, the Rathbome No. 2 Well was the only pro-
ducing well, and it was reworked that same year to establish gas produc-
tion from the same zones in which recompletion occurred nearly a year
earlier. After 1999, the only reworking effort on the Rathbome No. 2
Well was done in 2005 and was precipitated by the filing of the instant
lawsuit in May of 2005. The well was reworked and recompleted as a gas
well, however, the reworking was preceded by approximately 35 con-
secutive months of operational losses. Additionally, and in conjunction
with the above stated facts, the Court found that Ascent persistently
failed to fulfill its statutory contractual obligations to reasonably explore
and develop the Rathborne Lease by failing to participate in a 3D survey,
failing to pursue farmouts, failing to timely participate in a 2D study that
might have disclosed the presence of potentially profitable oil and gas
- 10 -
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deposits and failing to release retained acreage with a well having little
or no meaningful production for almost a year.
For the failure to develop the mineral lease, the Court awarded
Rathbome $2,916,000,000.00 for lost leasing revenue. The Court also
found that the Rathbome lease was cancelled due to Ascent's failure to
produce the lease in paying quantities, as the Rathborne No. 2 Well was
operating on little or no meaningful production and was being held by
Ascent for speculative reasons until almost the eve of trial preparations.
Also, the Court found that Ascent ceased to be a good faith possessor of
the Rathbome land on the date of judicial demand putting them on notice
of the claim, that being February 14, 2006, and that Rathbome was enti-
tled to an accounting of payment of the value of all production from the
Rathborne No. 2 Well, less royalties paid to date. Finally, the Court
found that Rathbome was entitled to an award of attorney's fees in con-
nection with its demand from dissolution of the mineral lease for As-
cent's failure to comply with its obligations, citing LA-R.S. 31:207 and
209.
13. EnTerra Energy, L.L.C. v. Wadi Petroleum, Inc., 2008 WL
4534394 (E.D.La.).
EnTerra, a working interest owner with respect to two (2) wells,
namely State Lease 18076 No. 2 (hereinafter referred to as "SL No. 2")
and Louisiana Delta Farms No. 2 ("LDF No. 2"), sued Wadi Petroleum
("Wadi") and Brammer Engineering ("Brammer"), the operator and
agent operator of the wells, respectively. EnTerra claims that it was
wrongfully declared a non-consenting party in both wells, and as a result,
was deprived of income from those wells, and was wrongfully subject to
500% penalties. Before the Court herein is a Motion for Summary Judg-
ment filed by plaintiff, EnTerra, with respect to the primary claims here-
in.
With respect to the SL No. 2 Well, Brammer notified EnTerra by
certified mail that EnTerra owed $356,876.00 on a prior well drilled on
that lease, the SL No. I Well. Said notification included the statement
that Brammer had the right to place EnTerra in non-consent status if full
payment for outstanding costs associated with the SL No. 1 Well were
not paid in full within 10 days. Said notification was mailed on March
30, 2006. Thereafter, on August 25, 2006, Brammer notified EnTerra and
other the non-operating parties of a proposal to drill a replacement well,
the SL No. 2, and asked EnTerra to pay its share of the anticipated cost.
On August 30, 2006, EnTerra elected to participate in the SL No. 2, and
submitted to Brammer checks for its amount owed for the anticipated
cost of drilling the SL No. 2, in addition to its unpaid share of the cost for
the SL No. 1. However, the check for the cost of the SL No. 1 bounced.
On September 26, 2006, EnTerra wired Wadi the full amount to cover
said bounced check. On September 22, 2006, Brammer notified EnTerra
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that because of EnTerra's failure to pay the full amount due pursuant to
the outstanding invoices for the SL No. 1, that Brammer was deeming
EnTerra to be non-consent for SL No. 2. The Court found that there was
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether EnTerra was properly put
in non-consent status, due to the fact that Brammer did not take the sec-
ond step in placing EnTerra in non-consent until after EnTerra had al-
ready paid its share of expenses on the SL No. 2, and after the SL No. 2
operation had already commenced.
With respect to the LDF No. 2 Well, because the well was an initial
well not subject to an election, the Court found that the remedy for un-
timely payment was limited to a security interest in the operator's share
of oil and gas production interest and a right to sue to compel payment.
14. Hall v. James, 986 So.2d 817, 43,263 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/4/08).
The plaintiffs were owners of certain mineral interests in immovable
property located in Webster Parish. Plaintiffs filed this action to recover
mineral proceeds which the defendant, Samson Contour Energy E&P,
LLC ("Samson"), overpaid other mineral owners of an undivided interest
in the immovable along with the plaintiffs, and underpaid the plaintiffs as
a result thereof. The plaintiffs sought to recover from both Samson and
the mineral owners who were overpaid, the amounts attributable to the
plaintiffs' ownership interest which were made in error beginning in
1996 until the payments were suspended by Samson.
The mineral owner defendants, Larry and Lisa James (hereinafter
referred to as the "Jameses"), filed an Exception of No Cause Action
against the plaintiffs arguing that the plaintiffs had no cause of action to
recover the overpayment to them because there was no privity of contact,
and the only other theory of recovery against the Jameses was based on
unjust enrichment. The Jameses argued that the plaintiffs had no claim
for unjust enrichment against them because plaintiffs have a cause of
action against Samson, and thus does not comply with all of the require-
ments for unjust enrichment set forth by the Supreme Court in Industrial
Companies, Inc. v. Derbonne, 2002-0665 (La. 1/28/03), 837 So.2d 1207.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the James' argument and held that
because the plaintiffs have a cause of action against Samson to recover
the underpayment of royalties to them and overpayment to the Jameses,
the requirement that the plaintiffs have no other remedy at law is not sat-
isfied in order to apply the remedy of unjust enrichment.
15. Trahan v. Devon Energy Production Company, 2009 WL 56911(W.D.La.).
The plaintiffs are a group of mineral right owners on property that
was leased to the defendants, and alleged that the defendant companies
failed to use reasonable care to develop and operate the leased property
as a reasonable prudent operator, resulting in a loss of production. The
action was originally filed in State court, however, the defendants re-
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moved this action alleging diversity and bankruptcy jurisdiction as a ba-
sis for removal. While two (2) of the defendants were Louisiana citizens,
the defendants alleged that their citizenship should be ignored because
the plaintiffs have no reasonable basis for recovery against them because
neither owed any obligations to plaintiffs under the leases. The two (2)
Louisiana defendants were acting as brokers and took the leases in their
names and immediately assigned same to other defendants. Plaintiffs
filed a motion to remand arguing that under Mineral Code Article 129
the Louisiana defendants were not relieved of their obligations even if
they were only acting as brokers.
The Court found that remand to State court was proper, based on its
finding that Mineral Code Article 129 does not relieve a broker taking a
mineral lease in its own name even though that person was merely taking
the lease on behalf of an undisclosed agent. Based on this finding, the
Court found that it was possible for the plaintiffs to have a cause action
against Louisiana broker defendants.
16. Pioneer Exploration, Ltd v. Rutherford, 2008 WL 1711411
(W.D.La.).
In 2005 Pioneer contacted the Rutherfords to initiate lease negotia-
tions on immoveable property owned by them. Throughout the negotia-
tions for the mineral lease, the preliminary draft of the leases recited the
acreage intended to be covered as being 7 acres. However, Pioneer ad-
vised the Rutherfords that it required a better property description. The
Rutherfords' attorney faxed Pioneer a property description that showed
the defendants owned 22 acres in Cameron Parish. Pioneer inserted the
property description of 22 acres into the mineral lease. The Rutherfords
did not read the final lease agreement. Upon noticing the error in the
property description, i.e., describing the property as 22 acres instead of 7
acres, the Rutherfords demanded renegotiation of the lease and threat-
ened litigation, to which Pioneer responded by filing this suit for declara-
tion of the validity of its lease and the acreage covered thereby. Plaintiff
moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court.
In support of its defense that the mineral lease should be limited to 7
acres, rather than the 22 acres, the defendants assert that Pioneer commit-
ted a fraud on the Rutherfords because they relied on the integrity of
Pioneer's legal counsel and did not expect Pioneer to claim that the lease
covered all of the land owned by the Rutherfords in Cameron Parish. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision stating that the law
does not permit "this court to find fraud when the terms of the contract
were clearly spelled out on the first page of the final lease agreement,
and where the Rutherfords failed to read the final document."
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IV. DNR/State Agency Regulation
17. Cedyco Corporation v. Department of Natural Resources,
2008 WL 2828766, 2007-2500 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/23/08).
Plaintiff herein sought a judicial review of a decision of the Division of
Administrative Law, which upheld the decision of the Commissioner of
Conservation declaring certain oil field sites operated by Cedyco in the
State of Louisiana to be orphaned pursuant to Louisiana Oil Field Site
Restoration Law, La. R.S. 30:80, et seq. The district court affirmed the
Commissioner's decision and upheld the Division of Administration Law
decision affirming same as well. Cedyco contends that the Commissioner
was arbitrary and capricious in his determination that the oil field sites
were not maintained in accordance with all statutory requirements.
Commissioner of Conservation has the authority to declare a site to
be an orphaned oil field site upon a finding that: 1) no responsible party
can be located, or such party has failed or is financially unable to under-
take actions ordered by the Assistant Secretary; and 2) the oil field site
either: a) was not closed or maintained in accordance with all statutory
requirements and the regulations adopted thereunder; or b) constitutes or
may constitute a danger or potential danger to the public health, the envi-
ronment or an oil or gas strata, citing La. R.S. 30:91(A)(1) and (2). Pur-
suant to this authority, Commissioner of Conservation issued 2 compli-
ance orders to Cedyco for 2 different wells claiming a multitude of safety
and other regulatory violations. Although Cedyco repeatedly assured
Conservation that the deficiency at the sites would be corrected, the sites
were never brought into full compliance. Thereafter, the Commissioner
of Conservation issued a finding that both wells operated by Cedyco
were orphaned. Under these factors, the Court of Appeals found that the
Commissioner's decision was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of
discretion, and accordingly, the judgment of the district court was af-
firmed.
18. Pennzoil Exploration and Production Co. v. Louisiana State Min-
eral Board, 2008 WL 2065073 2006-0708 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/2/08).
On November 8, 1978, the mineral board, acting on behalf of the
State of Louisiana as lessor, granted a mineral lease to the predecessors
in interest of Pennzoil. The mineral lease covered a portion of State Tract
No. 15242 situated in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The dispute be-
tween the parties concerned the payment of gas royalties owed to the
State pursuant to the state lease, and in particular, concerned whether the
royalty to be paid by the lessee to the State for gas produced from the
mineral lease was to be based on the price paid for the sale of intrastate
gas under an intrastate sales contract between the lessees and an intra-
state pipeline or was it to be based upon a blended price from interstate
and intrastate sales of the gas by the lessees. An addendum to the mineral
lease required the mineral lessee to make a diligent and good faith effort
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to obtain an intrastate market for the gas and, if such a market can be
obtained, to enter into a gas sales contract for the intrastate marketing of
said gas.
Once the well drilled pursuant to the mineral lease was deemed to
be commercially productive, the lessee requested that the board waive
the requirement set forth in the above addendum requiring the lessee to
obtain an intrastate market for the gas. Pursuant to that request, the min-
eral board adopted a resolution on November 14, 1979, allowing the les-
see to waive the intrastate gas marketing provisions of the mineral lease.
Thereafter, the lessee sold portions of the gas produced based upon a
blended price comprised of 80% of the interstate sales and 20% of the
intrastate sales. The State complained and asserted that the November 14,
1979 resolution amended the terms of the lease thereby requiring the les-
see to sell the gas produced pursuant to only the intrastate prices. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff lessees
finding that the mineral board resolution was not a written contract be-
tween the parties and thus could not alter the clear language of the min-
eral lease, and the addendum thereto. The Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's decision finding that the Board and the lessee recognized
that the request by the lessee to waive the intrastate gas marketing provi-
sions (which resulted in the resolution) did in fact alter the terms of the
mineral lease.
18. Objective Considerations for Late Release of State Lease
On February 2, 2009, the Office of Mineral Resources held a meet-
ing to discuss "criteria for waiver of liquidated damage assessments for
the late release of a state mineral lease", which purport to institute a new
objective criteria for the possible waiver of all or a portion of the liqui-
dated damages which may be assessed pursuant to the state lease form
for the late release of acreage held under a state mineral lease. The pro-
posed criteria contained a complete waiver of the liquidated damage as-
sessment for an operator's first infraction, and provided for a graduated
scale of damage reductions based on the percentage of total acreage re-
leased late from a lease, the number of prior infractions by an operator,
and the total number of days by which the acreage was untimely re-
leased. The criteria also provided authority for the mineral board to fur-
ther waive a portion of the liquidated damage for cause if the board de-
termines that such reduction is warranted.
The February meeting to discuss these proposed criteria was at-
tended by a number of attorneys and landmen who broker or operate on
state leases. During this meeting, a modification of the new criteria was
discussed which would provide for a new notice provision to operators
giving them 30 days to respond to a letter inquiring the release of state
acreage. Following this 30 day period, a demand would be sent for re-
lease of the acreage within 60 days if it is shown in fact that the lease has
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expired. These delays would in fact give an operator a certain grace pe-
riod from the notice provided by the letter in order to assess whether the
lease in question has in fact terminated.
According to the Office of Mineral Resources, the comments and
concerns raised at the February meeting are under consideration in the
further revision of these criteria. The revised criteria are tentatively sche-
duled to come before the State Mineral Board at the April, 2009 mineral
board meeting.
V. Pipeline Issues/St. Julien Doctrine
19. Aertker v. Placid Holding Co., 2008 WL 4200310 (M.D.La.).
Plaintiffs are the owners of a tract of land totaling approximately
550 acres located in LaSalle Parish, Louisiana. Plaintiffs' predecessor in
title granted a 99 year lease on timber and wood products to Herbert N.
Tannehill, who assigned said lease to Louisiana-Pacific Corporation. In
September of 1981, the timber lessee granted a right of way across the
property to the defendants' predecessor in interest, for the construction
and maintenance of an 8 inch pipeline on the subject property. Plaintiffs
allege that the defendants never sought from the plaintiffs, nor did plain-
tiffs grant, a right of way over the subject property for the construction of
said pipeline. The defendants constructed and operated a pipeline across
plaintiffs' property between 1982 and 2000, and transferred the subject
pipeline to Central Louisiana Energy Pipeline Co., LLC in December of
2000. Plaintiffs sought recovery herein on 2 theories of liability: 1) plain-
tiffs claim that they are the owners of the pipeline because the pipeline
was incorporated into their property and ownership passed to the plain-
tiffs through Louisiana law of accession; and 2) plaintiffs claim that de-
fendants have committed the continuing tort of trespass, for which tort
the defendants are liable in damages.
The defendants' defense to these claims is that the St. Julien Doc-
trine, codified at La. R.S. 19:14, limits plaintiffs' recovery to the fair
market value of the right of way at the time the pipeline was constructed.
Defendants alleged that amount was not sufficient to meet the prerequi-
site jurisdictional amount for suit in federal court. Plaintiffs claimed that
they are entitled to the fair rental value of the pipeline between 1982 and
2000, together with interest on rental obligations from the date rental
payments were theoretically due, and allege that that amount is sufficient
to meet the jurisdictional amount for suit in federal court.
Pursuant to the St. Julien Doctrine, a landowner is deemed to have
waived his right to receive prior compensation from a common carrier
which, in good faith and with the acquiescence and consent of the owner,
takes possession of and constructs facilities on privately owned immove-
able property for a public purpose. The Court herein found that the St.
Julien Doctrine was not applicable to limit plaintiffs' recovery because
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the application of that doctrine requires a good faith belief by the pipe-
line company that it had authority to construct the facilities on the land,
and pursuant to the facts before the court, the defendants did not possess
the requisites of good faith.
In reaching its conclusion, the court stated that the defendants did
not possess such good faith because it was "granted a right of way, not
by the owner of the property, but only by the timber lessee of the prop-
erty,...and a search of the public records would have disclosed the iden-
tity of the landowners and would have disclosed that the grantor of the
defendants' right of way was not such owner." The court also found that
the landowners did not acquiesce in the construction thereof, because
they had little contact with the subject property and did not learn of the
existence of a pipeline until 2002, 20 years after construction of the pipe-
line, which thereby negated "any suggestion that the plaintiff consented
to or acquiesce in its construction and maintenance." Finally, the court
found that the plaintiffs' claims with regard to the tort of trespass, were
not barred by the one year prescriptive period applicable to such actions,
even though plaintiffs allege that they became aware of the existence of
the pipeline in 2002 and did not commence this proceeding until 2007.
The court found that the plaintiffs "allege that the trespass committed by
the defendants meets the definition of a continuing tort for which a limi-
tations period did not begin to run."
20. Exxon Mobil Pipeline Co. v. Boyce, et al, 2008 WL 2567649 2007-
0241 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/6/08).
The defendants' predecessor in title executed a right of way grant in
favor of the plaintiffs predecessor in interest. They gave a right of way
over defendants' property to construct pipelines together with a separate
right of ingress and egress over and across said lands. Additionally, in
1970, the parties executed another right of way which gave the plaintiff a
specific 50' wide right of way to construct 3 additional pipelines on the
subject property, and also granted a separate right of ingress and egress
to construct and maintain said pipeline.
Prior to 2005, Exxon had enjoyed the use of roads over defendants'
property to access its pipelines. However, thereafter Exxon claimed that
it was denied the use of said roads on 2 occasions. Pursuant to testimony
before the court, an agent for Exxon testified that plaintiff told him, upon
attempting to utilize one of those said roads to maintain the pipeline,
"that if he took one more step toward defendants' property he wouldn't
be going no where but to jail." Defendants demanded that Exxon access
its right of way only by traveling along the right of way itself, rather than
the roads leading up to said right of way. The defendants interpreted the
right of way agreement to mean that Exxon could only utilize the defen-
dant's property outside of the right of way to access its pipeline when
there was an emergency such as a rupture in the pipeline and that the
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roads and bridges on the defendant's property were not to be used for
access during normal operations.
At a trial on this matter, the trial court denied Exxon's request for a
permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from preventing Exxon to
utilize the roads and bridges across defendant's property to access its
right of way. The First Circuit reversed the trial court's decision and
granted Exxon's injunction, stating that the 1956 right of way grant gives
Exxon a right of ingress and egress over and across all of the defendants'
property, and that the defendants' attempt to restrict Exxon's access to its
servitude constituted a disturbance in Exxon's enjoyment of that right.
VI. Acquisitive Prescription/Possession
21. Caldwell Lands, Inc. v. Cedyco Corporation, 980 So.2d 827, 2007-
1515 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/2/08).
Caldwell Lands, Inc. ("Caldwell") is the owner of a tract of land
contained within the Cristellaria A-7 Sand, Reservoir A, Sand Unit B
("the Unit"). Cedyco became the operator of the Unit on October 1,
1997. Cedyco admitted that as operator of the Unit, it produced oil, gas
and/or condensate from said Unit, and did not pay any proceeds for pro-
duction from said Unit to Caldwell. Caldwell filed this suit against Ce-
dyco to recover the proceeds from oil, gas and/or condensate production
attributable to its 10.3 acre tract included in the Unit. The trial court ren-
dered judgment in favor of Caldwell in the amount of $27,902.00, to-
gether with interest of $10,050.00. The trial court also found that Cedyco
was a bad faith possessor and that it was not entitled to reimbursement
for its drilling and production expenses.
While Caldwell alleged that Cedyco did not own a mineral lease
covering the subject property contained in the Unit, Cedyco denied that
allegation in its Answer. The court found that Caldwell did not carry its
burden of proof in proving that Cedyco was a bad faith possessor. Pursu-
ant to C.C. art. 488, a good faith possessor has a right to be reimbursed
for his expenses, but a bad faith possessor does not. Good faith is pre-
sumed, but the presumption can be rebutted with proof that the possessor
knows or should know that he is not the owner of the thing. Cedyco ar-
gued that it cannot be found to be a possessor in bad faith because they
produce oil and gas from Caldwell's land with a lease. The Court of Ap-
peals reversed the trial court's decision, and held that Caldwell did not
carry its burden of proof in proving that Cedyco did not own a mineral
lease from Caldwell on the subject property, and thus, Cedyco was enti-
tled to recoup its drilling and production expenses.
22. Mayers v. Marmet, 985 So.2d 315, 2008-127 (La. App. 3 Cir.
5/28/08).
On February 18, 1991, Rodney J. Grantham, Sr. purportedly exe-
cuted an inter vivos donation in favor of Rodney J. Grantham, Jr., hus-
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band of Alisa H. Grantham, covering a 5 acre tract of land located in
Vermillion Parish, Louisiana ("the subject property"). However, the do-
nation was an absolute nullity as it was not passed before a notary public
and 2 witnesses as required by La. C.C. art. 1536. Following execution
of the purported donation, the donee thereunder, Rodney J. Grantham,
Jr., transferred the subject property by Cash Deed dated April 23, 2003,
to Geraldine R. Hebert, wife of Richard J. Hebert. Thereafter, Richard J.
Hebert and Geraline R. Hebert attempted to donate such lands to the de-
fendant, Sonny Marmet, by an Act of Donation dated February 15, 2006.
However, the donor of the absolutely null 1991 Donation, Rodney J.
Grantham, Sr., executed a mineral deed dated July 26, 2005, wherein he
transferred the rights to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in, under or
which may be produced from the subject property to the plaintiff, Phil D.
Mayers, Jr., et ux.
The plaintiff argued that because the defendants rights to the prop-
erty stemmed from an absolutely null Act of Donation in 1991, that he
acquired the mineral rights to the subject property from the record owner
thereof, being Rodney J. Grantham, Sr.; and for the same reason, the
plaintiff argued that defendant had not acquired any rights to the subject
property because the vendors from which he acquired said rights were
not the owners thereof due to the absolutely null 1991 Donation. The
defendants claim that even though the 1991 Donation was in effect, null,
that he and his ancestors in title had possessed the subject property for
longer than 10 years and had acquired rights thereto by acquisitive pre-
scription. The trial court found that the defendants did not have good
faith and just title as is required for the application of the 10 year acquisi-
tive prescription, and thus, found that the plaintiffs were entitled to a
grant of its motion for summary judgment holding that the plaintiffs were
the owners of all of the oil, gas and minerals under the subject property.
The Court of Appeals found that the defendants did not have just
title to base the application of 10 year acquisitive prescription on, due to
the fact that the Donation was not in a valid form, and thus could not
serve as just title. The defendants argued that the Louisiana legislature
changed the law regarding the requirement that a possessor have both
good faith and just title to permit tacking of possession with respect to
his ancestor in title's possession. The defendant argued that one could
either have just title or good faith in order to tack his ancestor in title's
possession to that of his own for application of acquisitive prescription.
The court disagreed and stated that good faith and just title are not sepa-
rate concepts, but that both must exist for acquisition of ownership by the
10 year period of acquisitive prescription.
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23. St John Baptist Church of Phoenix v. Thomas, 2008 WL 5192336
(La. App. 4 Cir. 12/3/08).
On November 25, 1874, Cornelius Thomas, Samuel Reed, Wash-
ington Goodeye and Phillip Hill purchased a tract of immovable property
located in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, which is the property that is
the subject of this lawsuit. Plaintiffs alleged that the sole purpose for the
purchase of the property by these individuals was to create St. John Bap-
tist Church of Phoenix, Louisiana (the "Church"), however the property
was never transferred to the Church. Nonetheless, the Church alleges that
it has exercised possession of, control of, and used the property since that
date, a fact which is not disputed by the defendants herein. The Church
filed this action for declaratory judgment asking the Court to declare that
the Church has acquired the subject property through 30 years acquisitive
prescription. The defendants sued herein are the heirs of one of the origi-
nal vendees in the 1874 Act of Sale.
Although the defendants concede that the Church has possessed and
used the property for 133 years, they argued that the Church's possession
was precarious and not adverse, and because of that title has never been
obtained. La. C.C. art. 3437 provides that possession is precarious when
exercised with the permission of the owner. Accordingly, acquisitive
prescription does not run in favor of a precarious possessor who is pre-
sumed to possess for another, despite his intent to possess for himself. In
order to overcome this presumption, the precarious possessor must serve
notice on the owner that he intends to possess on his own behalf, and this
notice may be implied if there is open, notorious, public, continuous and
uninterrupted possession to the exclusion of the owners. The defendants
argued that the Church only possessed the property with the permission
of the vendees of the 1874 Act of Sale, and has not demonstrated to those
owners the requisite possession to overcome the presumption that the
Church was possessing on behalf of the 1874 vendees.
The Court found that acts taken by the Church such as executing
mineral leases, responding to expropriation litigation, and taking reme-
dial action in response to governmental complaints, served as open, noto-
rious, public, continuous and uninterrupted possession to the exclusion of
the 1874 vendees, and thus acquisitive prescription ran in the Church's
favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of
the Church, finding that the Church was the owner of the subject prop-
erty, and it had acquired said ownership by the application of 30 years
acquisitive prescription.
VII. Torts (Personal Injury/Contamination Suits)
24. Kling Realty Company, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2008 WL
5243889 (C.A.5 (La.)).
Plaintiffs are owners of immovable property located in Iberia Par-
ish, and alleged that Chevron and its predecessor contaminated the sub-
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ject property when engaged in the exploration and production of oil and
gas thereon. The alleged contamination was caused by Well No. 6, which
was the only one of the wells that was productive and that was drilled on
the plaintiffs property. That well was plugged and abandoned on Octo-
ber 1971.
In defense to plaintiffs claims, Chevron filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment based on the fact that those claims had prescribed
prior to the filing of this action in June of 2006. Because it had been over
a year since the time that the tortuous conduct occurred in the filing of
the tort suit, the Court found that the plaintiff had the burden of proving
that prescription was suspended or interrupted by either contra non va-
lentem and/or by the theory of continuing tort. The Court found that con-
tra non valentem was not applicable to this case because Chevron did not
do anything to prevent the plaintiffs from acquiring knowledge of the
alleged contamination, in addition to citing testimony by the plaintiff that
he noted low yields in crops when farming the tract, which would have
raised a reasonable suspicion of the contamination. The Court found that
the plaintiffs had information sufficient to excite attention and prompt
further inquiry by the 1970's, yet did not proceed with any investigation
of their claims.
The Court then turned to consideration of whether prescription was
suspended by the theory of continuing tort, which under Louisiana law
states that prescription does not begin to run until the conduct causing the
tortuous damage ceases. The Court found that the theory of continuing
tort did not apply to this case, because a continuing tort is occasioned by
unlawful acts, and not continuation of the ill effects of an original,
wrongful or negligent act. citing Crump v. Sabine River Authority, 737
So.2d 720 (La. 1999). Further, the Court stated "the breach of the duty to
right a wrong and make the plaintiff whole simply cannot be a continuing
wrong which suspends the running of prescription, as that is the purpose
of any lawsuit and the obligation of every tortfeasor." The Court went on
to state that in order for the theory of continuing tort to apply, there must
be some type of continuing conduct or continuing damage, such as the
continuous leaking of gas tanks, or the continuing dumping of garbage or
litter on another's property throughout a period of time. The Court stated
that Chevron's actions ceased in 1971 when the Well No. 6 was plugged
and abandoned, and that there was no further continuing damage or con-
tinuing conduct which implicated application of the continuing tort doc-
trine.
25. Naiman v. Goldsberry Operating Company, Inc., 2008 WL
2357379, 43, 266 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/11/08).
Plaintiff was employed by Energy Drilling Company ("Energy"),
and was assigned to work on the Goldsberry No. 1 Well site near Shre-
veport, Louisiana. While performing his duties on said well, the plaintiff
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was struck by the boom of a forklift as it toppled over, and as a result is
now a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair. Plaintiff filed suit against
Goldsberry Operating Company, Inc. ("Goldsberry"), who was the op-
erator of said well and who contracted Energy to perform the work on
the Goldsberry No. 1 Well site, alleging that Goldsberry was negligent in
tort for failure to adequately and properly prepare the well site at issue, in
addition to other allegations.
Goldsberry filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal
of all claims filed against it alleging that Goldsberry did not owe a duty
in tort to Naiman pursuant to the two contract defense. The trial court
signed a Judgment granting said Motion for Summary Judgment and
dismissing with prejudice the claims of plaintiff against Goldsberry.
Goldsberry argued that because it initially entered into a contract
with the working interest owners through letter agreements and subse-
quently entered into the Turnkey Contract with Energy Drilling to per-
form the drilling operations, it should be classified as a principle as de-
fined under the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Statute, and as such,
the plaintiff should be limited to relief in the form of worker's compensa-
tion, rather than tort. Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1061, the workers
compensation statute, applies to a principal in the situation where a prin-
cipal contracts with another to perform all or any part of the work, and
then contracts with another to perform the work which the principal is
contractually obligated to perform. The Court found that the two contract
theory should apply in this case because Goldsberry was under a contrac-
tual duty to drill the Goldsberry No. 1 to its working interest owners, and
because Goldsberry contracted with Energy to perform said contractual
duties. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant-
ing of Goldsberry's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed plain-
tiff's action against Goldsberry with prejudice.
VIII. Saltwater Disposal Wells
26. Crooks, et ux v. Placid Oil Company, et al, 981 So.2d 125, 2007-
980 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/9/08).
The plaintiffs predecessor in title granted a Saltwater Disposal Sys-
tem Agreement to the defendants on September 29, 1981. Said agree-
ment granted Placid the privilege of maintaining a saltwater disposal well
and system on a one (1) acre portion of her property surrounding the lo-
cation of a pre-existing oil well. Plaintiffs' predecessor in title also
granted a right-of-way across the remainder of her property to convey
saltwater and other materials from wells in the area to the saltwater injec-
tion well. Plaintiffs filed suit against Placid alleging that the saltwater
disposal agreements did not allow Placid to inject saltwater originating
from wells located outside of their property into the disposal well.
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The trial court granted Placid's Motion for Summary Judgment
finding that the saltwater disposal agreements expressly permitted Placid
and its successors to bring saltwater from outside of the plaintiffs' prop-
erty onto the 1 acre well site. The trial court further found that there was
no restriction on the quantity of water that could be injected. The trial
court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against Placid. The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's decision and found that while the agree-
ment was explicit and states that Placid could bring saltwater from wells
located outside of the subject property, also found that the arguments
submitted by the parties outside of the four corners of the contract also
supported Placid's position. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision dismissing plaintiff s claim against Placid.
27. Lanclos v. Crown DBL, Inc., 2008 WL 5159204, 2008-813 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 12/10/08).
Crown DBL, Inc. ("Crown") was sued by the plaintiff for personal
injury sustained by the plaintiff while performing services on the well.
Crown was a subcontractor of Sabine Storage & Operations, Inc. ("Sa-
bine"), who was awarded the contract to drill the saltwater disposal well.
Sabine's contract with Crown included in an indemnity provision under
which Sabine agreed to protect, defend and indemnify Crown from and
against all claims arising in connection herewith in favor of operator em-
ployees or operator contractors.
Crown filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking to en-
force that provision and have Sabine fulfill its obligations under the in-
demnity provision. Sabine's defense to Crown's request was that the
Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act La.R.S. 9:2780, renders the indemnity
provision in that contract null and void. La. R.S. 9:2780 declares null and
void and against public policy of the State of Louisiana any provision in
any agreement which requires defense and/or indemnification against the
loss or liability for damages arising out of or resulting from death or bod-
ily injury to persons, which is caused by or results from the sole or con-
current negligence or fault (strict liability) of the indemnitee. The Court
of Appeals stated that Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act was enacted to
provide for the invalidity of certain indemnity agreements affecting in-
dustries engaging in the development, exploration, and exploitation of
sources of energy. The Court found that while a saltwater disposal well
was collateral to the production of natural gas, the saltwater is not a
source of energy that is being developed, explored or exploited as con-
templated by the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act, but a waste byprod-
uct which must be disposed of. Accordingly, the Court found that the
Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act did not apply to this case so as to ren-
der Sabine's indemnity and indemnification obligation to Crown null and
void. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's deter-
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mination that Sabine owes a defense and indemnity to Crown pursuant to
the agreement between those parties.
IX. Successions
28. Succession of Jones, 986 So.2d 809, 43,365 (La. App. 2 Cir.
6/4/08).
The issue in this case involves an action filed by one son, Hurie
Jones, to annul a donation inter vivos of 11 acres made by John Jones,
Sr. prior to his death, to another son, Melvin Jones. The instrument enti-
tled "Donation Deed" was filed of record on October 21, 2003. The trial
court ruled that the Donation Deed was null and void because there was
no formal acceptance by the Donee, and ordered that the 11 acres be
brought into the active mass of the succession.
The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision, citing La.
C.C. art. 1540, which states "a donation inter vivos shall be binding on
the donor, and shall produce effect only from the day of its being ac-
cepted in precise terms." Additionally, the Second Circuit cited the Su-
preme Court in Rutherford v. Rutherford, 346 So.2d 669 (La. 1977), in
which the Supreme Court stated "the requirement that a donee accept the
donation in precise terms allocates the donee to use express, formal, and
unconditional language in his acceptance. This provision, we think, re-
quires an explicit acceptance. A tactic acceptance or acceptance inferred
from the circumstances will not suffice." While Melvin Jones did sign
the Donation Deed, there was no formal acceptance of the donation, and
there was no explicit language to signify acceptance as required by the
Court. Accordingly, the Court found that a signature alone cannot be
construed as an acceptance and cannot be inferred from the circum-
stances, and thus the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision
holding that the Donation Deed to Melvin Jones was null and void and
without effect.
X. Changes in Statutory Law
29. Act No. 855 - Community Property.
Act No. 855 provides that although fruits of the separate property of
a spouse, minerals produced from a separate asset, and bonuses, delay
rentals, royalties, and shut-in payments arising from mineral leases are
community property, Civil Code Article 2339 is amended to provide that
a spouse may reserve them as his separate property.
30. Act No. 115 - Risk Fee Statute.
Act No. 115 of the 2008 Regular Session, effective June 6, 2008,
amended LSA-R.S. 30:10(A)(2)(b)(i) to increase the penalty for a non-
consent owner and for owners who failed to pay expenses from 100% to
200% of the tract's allocated share of the costs of drilling, testing, and
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